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Abstract
Background: Geographic Information Systems (GIS) can provide valuable insight into patterns of
human activity. Online spatial display applications, such as Google Earth, can democratise this
information by disseminating it to the general public. Although this is a generally positive advance
for society, there is a legitimate concern involving the disclosure of confidential information
through spatial display. Although guidelines exist for aggregated data, little has been written
concerning the display of point level information. The concern is that a map containing points
representing cases of cancer or an infectious disease, could be re-engineered back to identify an
actual residence. This risk is investigated using point mortality locations from Hurricane Katrina re-
engineered from a map published in the Baton Rouge Advocate newspaper, and a field team
validating these residences using search and rescue building markings.
Results: We show that the residence of an individual, visualized as a generalized point covering
approximately one and half city blocks on a map, can be re-engineered back to identify the actual
house location, or at least a close neighbour, even if the map contains little spatial reference
information. The degree of re-engineering success is also shown to depend on the urban
characteristic of the neighborhood.
Conclusion: The results in this paper suggest a need to re-evaluate current guidelines for the
display of point (address level) data. Examples of other point maps displaying health data extracted
from the academic literature are presented where a similar re-engineering approach might cause
concern with respect to violating confidentiality. More research is also needed into the role urban
structure plays in the accuracy of re-engineering. We suggest that health and spatial scientists
should be proactive and suggest a series of point level spatial confidentiality guidelines before
governmental decisions are made which may be reactionary toward the threat of revealing
confidential information, thereby imposing draconian limits on research using a GIS.
Background
Geospatial technologies and even Internet applications
such as Google Earth are now frequently used in both
social and biological sciences in the search for spatial pat-
terns and processes (for recent commentaries and exam-
ples see [1-3]). Geospatial display on the internet, such as
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Google Earth, not only provides a means to publicize the
importance of "geography", but also acts as a dissemina-
tion tool for spatial results. This democratisation of spa-
tial insight can have a dramatic impact on communities
without the technical ability, hardware or software to use
a Geographic Information System (GIS). At a recent sym-
posium jointly hosted by the National Institute on Drug
Abuse and the Association of American Geographers [4],
in the concluding discussion session the universal appre-
ciation of GIS was obvious. However, there was also a gen-
eral concern expressed about preserving individual
confidentiality within spatial displays. This concern is jus-
tified as map making, and the ability to deliver maps to a
mass audience through the Internet becomes steadily eas-
ier [5-8].
Most health related maps are thematic involving data
aggregated to a spatial unit, the most common map type
being the graduated color or "choropleth" map. In an
effort to protect individuals, the Health Insurance Porta-
bility and Accountability Act (HIPAA) provides guidelines
to inform researchers as how to preserve confidentiality
by employing minimum spatial denominator units on a
map. According to the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) health information can only be
disclosed, if all zip codes with the same three initial digits
exceed 20,000 people; otherwise the initial three digits are
changed to 000 [9]. This guideline can be interpreted in
another way. If we (conservatively) assume each building
contains approximately 4 people, then health informa-
tion should not be mapped at the residential level in areas
containing less than five thousand buildings. It is unfortu-
nate, however, that little exists explicitly for data display at
this point (residential) level, even though many such
maps exist in the academic literature. Examples of these
health related point level maps which will be briefly dis-
cussed in this paper include, the spatial association
between birth outcomes and disease (Toxoplasmosis)
[10], birth outcomes and residential/work proximity to
the World Trade Center [11], health effects of living close
to heavily trafficked routes [12] and cases of an infectious
disease[13].
Among the precautions that can be taken to preserve point
level confidentiality include the masking or spatial
manipulation of the location [14-17], the removal of
other geographic reference layers, or the use of software
agents [18]. In this last example the investigator never
works with point level information. A software agent act-
ing on behalf of the investigator, can access the data server
where confidential data are stored, perform the required
analysis functions, and return only useful aggregate results
without any individual-identifiable details to the
researcher [18].
If the researcher does have access to the original data, sim-
ply removing map detail, for example a road network,
may not be enough to ensure that confidentiality is pre-
served [16]. For example, if a residential "point" appears
in the middle of a map displaying only zip code bounda-
ries, how could this display violate any individual's confi-
dentiality, especially if all zip codes contain at least
20,000 individuals? The problem arises if the zip code
boundaries can be used to re-engineer the map data back
to smaller neighbourhoods, maybe even a street or single
house, and in so doing dramatically change the size of the
denominator. It is only prudent to test this assumption,
and attempt to re-engineer information (also called
inverse or reverse address matching) back to an individual
residence from an apparently "detail free" map [16]. This
is especially important given how easy it is to output GIS
layers and display information to a large Internet audi-
ence through geospatial packages such as Google Earth,
layers which as graphics can in turn be extracted and
imported back into a GIS environment.
Contributing factors in the successful re-engineering of
information from a cartographic display is the published
map's scale, the size (and quality) of the published map,
the projection used, and the accuracy (or error) in the ini-
tial mapping of the points. An error one would expect to
find between the geocoded and re-engineered address is
the positional error due to the address-matching proce-
dure. This error occurs when a list of addresses is matched
to a street network layer using a GIS. The extent of this
error can be calculated by comparing the location of the
gecoded addresses with a second measurement, usually
generated with a Global Positioning System (GPS) satel-
lite receiver or from an aerial image. As an example of
such an investigation using a random sample of 200
addresses taken from a life history project of 3286 sub-
jects, Bonner et al. (2003) found 79% of all distances
between the gecoded and the GPS point to be within 100
m, the median distance being 38 m. [19]. The same study
also found that urban addresses were slightly more accu-
rate than non-urban, with 33% of addresses being within
25 meters. The accuracy of placement also varied accord-
ing to the length of the road, with longer road segments,
which again tend to be found in non-urban areas, being
the least accurate [19].
When using a GIS to investigate geocoding error, the accu-
racy of the GPS measurement should also be taken into
consideration. The positional accuracy of the GPS receiver
can be tested using a National Geodetic Survey (NGS)
point. GPS positions are recorded by holding the unit
directly over the NGS point, for which the exact location
is known. Usually, more than 100 positions are recorded
for the same location at equal time intervals (for example,
every second). The final coordinate is then calculated asInternational Journal of Health Geographics 2006, 5:44 http://www.ij-healthgeographics.com/content/5/1/44
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the spatial average of all recorded positions. Positional
data can be used uncorrected or differentially corrected
with data from a nearby base station. Differentially cor-
rected positions have a higher accuracy compared to
uncorrected positions. Listi, et al. (2007) tested the posi-
tional accuracy of the GeoExplorer® 3 Data Collection Sys-
tem (a hand-held GPS receiver in the mid-price range)
from Trimble Navigation Limited for field mapping scat-
tered human remains or other materials in forensic inves-
tigations. Using the spatial average of 206 positions and
without any differential correction, the GPS unit pro-
duced an error of 3.523 meters (approx. 11.62 feet). In
contrast, post-processed differential correction for the
same spatial average of 206 positions produced an error of
0.424 meters (approx. 1.4 feet))[20]. Other considera-
tions when using a GPS to confirm geocode accuracy
include where the measurement was taken (for example
the property line or front door), the position of the satel-
lites, atmospheric conditions, and the line-of-sight to the
satellites, which can be interrupted by tree cover, build-
ings or other structures.
As an alternative measure of geocode accuracy, Cayo and
Talbot (2003) determined the positional error for 3,000
residential addresses using the distance between each
geocoded point and its true location as determined with
aerial imagery [21]. They found error increased as popula-
tion density decreased and that the geocoding error sub-
stantially decreased, when property data are used instead
of street network files. Both GPS and aerial imagery will be
used in this paper to verify re-engineered addresses.
The question posed in this paper is to what degree can
confidential information in the form of a person's home
residence be extracted, or "re-engineered" from a map
appearing in a journal article, book, newspaper or Internet
site, especially if most traditional spatial reference layers,
such as road networks, are removed from the map? In
order to investigate this question two experiments could
have been designed. The first would have been to fabricate
data that are then geocoded, mapped, and printed before
being given to a second team as a hard copy for re-engi-
neering. First (fabricated) and second (re-engineered)
addresses could be compared for separating distance (see
[22]for an example). This is a valuable line of inquiry
because of the insights it might provide not only in terms
of the violation of confidentiality, but also in how the
underlying population structure, street type, and building
patterns impact the process of re-engineering. In his exper-
iment Armstrong (2002) found that 68% of addresses
could be re-engineered to the correct residence, 85% to
the immediate neighbour, and 97% to the correct street
segment [16]. He goes on to comment that errors in the
geocode process would always leave an element of doubt
in this type of exercise as the accuracy (was it the "correct"
house) would be fuzzy. The second approach, and the one
employed in this paper, is to take an actual published map
of confidential residential information, and re-engineer
these data back to actual addresses. This approach is the
most appealing as it approximates the danger posed by
spatially representing confidential information, and hav-
ing a third party with no access to the actual data attempt-
ing to identify the residence of the "case". Although the
second approach is most appealing, it is, by definition,
almost impossible to investigate. If the data being
mapped are confidential, how would the field researcher
know if he/she had discovered the actual residence? How-
ever, Hurricane Katrina provided such an opportunity as a
published map displayed point locations of deaths, and
the search and rescue notations spray-painted on the
houses allowed field teams to verify the accuracy of the re-
engineering process. These markings also provide the
means to identify the correct address missing in the Arm-
strong study. Figure 1 shows a field team member stand-
ing in front of a typical destroyed house using a GPS to
mark the location. The search and rescue markings can be
seen on both the roof and wall of the building. These
markings can be deciphered as follows: the search team
affiliation (left side of the X), the date of visit (top of the
X), any "additional" information such as signs of looting
or whether animals were present (right side of the X), and
if any corpses were discovered (bottom of the X). It was
therefore possible to identify those houses where fatalities
had been discovered if a "1" or greater number was
marked at the bottom of the "X". In addition, other mark-
ings are associated with mortalities, including comments
such as "1 DB in back" or "Ken" which identifies the
recovery team most frequently tasked to remove the body.
In Figure 1 the first search and rescue team identified a
dead body on September 11th ("1 dead" appears at the
bottom of the X), and the body was removed on Septem-
ber 19th.
The Baton Rouge Advocate  printed a map of mortality
locations in Orleans and St Bernard Parishes on the 30th
December 2005 (Fig 2). This map contained neighbor-
hood areas of New Orleans (for example the Garden Dis-
trict, Lower Ninth Ward) and important features of the
disaster, including the location of levee breaks, canals and
floodwalls. The mortality locations were overlaid on a
graduated color surface of poverty rate mapped by census
tract. The map contained no roads or other references
points, except for a generalized location of the University
of New Orleans. Three neighborhoods heavily impacted
by Hurricane Katrina, but of different urban character,
were chosen for this study, these being the area around the
London Canal levee break, New Orleans East, which suf-
fered flooding directly from Lake Pontchartrain's surge,
and the Lower Ninth Ward which flooded as a result of the
Industrial Canal break. The specific goal of this investiga-International Journal of Health Geographics 2006, 5:44 http://www.ij-healthgeographics.com/content/5/1/44
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Hurricane Katrina search and rescue marking Figure 1
Hurricane Katrina search and rescue marking. This house displays the typical search and rescue "X". A California task 
force visited the house on September 11th and they found "1 dead". "Kenyon" removed the body on September 19th. The field 
team member is seen in front of the house marking its location with a GPS.International Journal of Health Geographics 2006, 5:44 http://www.ij-healthgeographics.com/content/5/1/44
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tion was to use the Advocate map to guide field teams to
the actual residence where a body was found. The larger
concept was to investigate how a similar map displaying
health outcomes could also be re-engineered to an actual
residence. It can be argued that the Advocate map of mor-
talities does not represent a confidential surface as these
data were mapped in the local paper, they are still "offi-
cially" considered such and have not been released to the
authors of this paper for further validation purposes.
However, this argument does not detract from the larger
purpose of the study.
Results
Table One displays the distances from all mortalities re-
engineered from the Advocate map to the closest street seg-
ment of the Orleans Parish street network. This was per-
formed to assess the degree to which the underlying street
pattern was preserved in the point locations on the map,
remembering that actual streets had been removed. In
total over 22% of all re-engineered mortalities were
within 5 meters of a street segment. This percentage rose
to over 45% when the distance from the mortality coordi-
nate to the street was 10 meters or less. This result suggests
that the original cartographer had employed a GIS based
address matching approach and the underlying street pat-
tern was still preserved within the mortality distribution.
Of the three study neighborhoods investigated in this
paper, the London Canal area had the greatest percentage
of addresses within 5 meters (37.5%) of a road section.
Although this might be indicative of the urban character
of the neighborhood, with more tightly packed streets
leading to a shorter distance to a road section by chance
alone, the percentage of randomly generated points from
100 simulation runs in the same area within 5 meters was
only 18%.
For all of Orleans Parish 18.4% of re-engineered mortali-
ties were greater than 25 meters from a street centre line.
Deaths from Katrina map Figure 2
Deaths from Katrina map. The original map appearing in the Baton Rouge Advocate on December 30th. The red points are 
the mortality locations which have been digitised and overlaid on the original image.International Journal of Health Geographics 2006, 5:44 http://www.ij-healthgeographics.com/content/5/1/44
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Of the three study neighborhoods, the area with the high-
est percentage of (poorly) re-engineered mortalities fall-
ing in this 25-meter category was New Orleans East
(25%), with the smallest percentage being the London
Canal area (4.2%). When considering the randomly gen-
erated points falling into this greater than 25-meter cate-
gory, all three neighborhoods registered higher
percentages, ranging from 42% in New Orleans East to
25.9% in the Lower Ninth Ward. This shows how the
underlying street pattern was still preserved in the
mapped mortality surface.
Of the 24 mortalities re-engineered from the Advocate map
in New Orleans East, 16 were identified to actual houses
by the field team. Around these 16 houses a further eight
residences were also sprayed with mortality markings.
These additional residences were so close to the re-engi-
neered location so as to fall within the "mortality circle"
which covered approximately one-and-half-city blocks
(Fig 3). The "mortality circle" is the white dot displaying
the death location on the Advocate map. Of the 20 mortal-
ities re-engineered from the Advocate map in the London
Canal area, 14 were identified by the field team. Around
these 14 houses a further two residences also could be
identified with mortality markings. Of the 36 mortalities
re-engineered from the Advocate map in the Lower Ninth
Ward, 22 were identified by the field team. Around these
22 houses a further four residences could also be identi-
fied with mortality markings.
Table Two displays distances between the re-engineered
mortalities and the closest field verified residences. The
percentage of verified residences falling into each category
of 5-meter increments is displayed. Of the three neighbor-
hoods, New Orleans East produced the highest percentage
of close distances between the re-engineered mortality
and the actual residence "pairs" with almost 23% being
within 10 meters, and over 40% being within 20 meters.
By comparison, only 6% of the pairs for the London
Canal, and 23% for the Lower Ninth Ward were within 20
meters.
As previously mentioned in this paper, there is an element
of uncertainty concerning any exact distance measure-
ment due to variations in both geocoding and GPS data
collection. Therefore a second measure, the number of
actual houses separating the re-engineered mortality and
the field verified residence, as identified on the aerial
imagery, was recorded. In three instances for New Orleans
East both the re-engineered mortality and the field veri-
fied residence fell on the same house. In addition, three
further pairs were separated only by the distance of the
Table 2: Distance between re-engineered and field verified residences.
Distance in meters 0 to 5 6 to 10 11 to 15 16 to 20 21 to 25 Above 25
New Orleans East
Percentage of matched 4.5 18.2 13.6 4.5 4.5 54.5
London Canal
Percentage of matched 0 6.3 0 0 6.3 87.5
Ninth Ward
Percentage of matched 0 0 19.2 3.8 7.7 69.2
Table 1: Distance for re-engineered and randomly generated points to the closest road.
Distance from road (meters) 0 to 5 6 to 10 11 to 15 16 to 20 21 to 25 Above 25
New Orleans East
Deaths From Map 16.7% 16.7% 8.3% 25.0% 8.3% 25.0%
Random Points 16.4% 12.5% 10.8% 9.4% 9.0% 42.0%
London Canal
Deaths From Map 37.5% 4.2% 16.7% 25.0% 8.3% 4.2%
Random Points 18.0% 15.7% 13.0% 10.3% 11.0% 32.1%
Ninth Ward
Deaths From Map 19.4% 27.8% 16.7% 11.1% 8.3% 16.7%
Random Points 19.6% 18.0% 14.9% 11.8% 10.0% 25.9%
All Deaths From Map (Orleans Parish) 22.5% 23.0% 14.1% 13.6% 8.4% 18.4%International Journal of Health Geographics 2006, 5:44 http://www.ij-healthgeographics.com/content/5/1/44
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Digitised mortality locations Figure 3
Digitised mortality locations. Mortality locations have been digitised from the newspaper map and are shown in terms of 
the coarseness of the original map image (a), and on a Google Earth display using the kmler tool in ArcMap (b). Each circle cov-
ers approximately 1.5 city blocks.
a)
b)International Journal of Health Geographics 2006, 5:44 http://www.ij-healthgeographics.com/content/5/1/44
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Distances between re-engineered mortalities and verified locations Figure 4
Distances between re-engineered mortalities and verified locations. The two locations in the detail from New Orle-
ans East are separated by half a street width (a). In the London Canal Area, both locations fall on the same house (b). In the 
Lower Ninth Ward the two locations are found on either side of the same street (c).
Re-engineered mortality coordinate
Field verified address
a)
b)
c)International Journal of Health Geographics 2006, 5:44 http://www.ij-healthgeographics.com/content/5/1/44
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house to the middle of the road. Five locations were next
door, and three more had only two intervening resi-
dences. The greatest intervening distance was six resi-
dences. For the London Canal area, one of the re-
engineered mortalities fell on the same field-verified resi-
dence, three were separated only by the distance to the
middle of the road or the house on the opposite side of
the street, and two houses were immediate neighbours to
the re-engineered location. The greatest separating dis-
tance was nine houses. The extent of damage in the Lower
Ninth Ward made this form of measurement impossible
due to the amount of residential destruction with many
houses having floated from their original foundation. Fig-
ures 4a–c display details for all three neighborhoods, with
the red dot marking the re-engineered coordinate, and the
yellow dot being the GPS measurement. Figure 4a (New
Orleans East) shows an example of the separating meas-
ure between the pairs as being the middle of the road, fig-
ure 4b (London Canal) is an example of where both
coordinates fall on the same residence, and 4c (Lower
Ninth Ward) shows where the address is on the other side
of the street.
A final step was to determine if the re-engineered coordi-
nate actually guided the field team to the mortality loca-
tion, or whether chance alone would have resulted in the
same level of discovery. A series of random coordinates
equalling the number of mortality residences were scat-
tered throughout the study areas. This simulation was
repeated 100 times generating a test distribution of mor-
talities. A 95% confidence level was determined if the dis-
tance between the actual re-engineered mortality and the
field verified residence was smaller than in 95 of all simu-
lated distances between a random coordinate and the
same field verified residence. Meeting this 95% level were
73% of the New Orleans East pairs, 75% of the London
Canal pairs, and 50% of the Lower Ninth Ward pairs. As
an even more extreme comparison, for New Orleans East
9 of the 22 pairs were closer than in any of the simulation
runs. Similarly, 3 of 16 pairs for the London Canal area,
and 1 in the Lower Ninth Ward were closer than to any of
the simulated coordinates.
Discussion
The success of this research should not be judged by the
percentage of successfully re-engineered mortalities that
can be verified back to an actual residence as other exter-
nalities could impact this process. These include: the body
was recovered from a non-residence, such as a road
median; the house has since been cleaned of all markings,
or no distinguishable "mortality" marking was left on the
residence; and the neighborhood could have suffered
such extreme damage that mortality markings were not
obvious, or the residence itself had disappeared or been
moved. The success of re-engineering mortalities from the
Advocate  map should rather be judged if any  residence
could be verified. The fact that many of the re-engineered
coordinates could be used to identify an actual address, or
an address within the immediate vicinity, should sound a
note of caution for academics publishing maps displaying
human cases as points. In order to further impress on this
point, and to show that similar cartographies have been
employed to map health data, the following surfaces in
the American Journal of Public Health, American Journal of
Tropical Medicine and Hygiene, Emerging Infectious Diseases,
Environmental Health Perspectives, and the International
Journal of Health Geographics are briefly discussed.
Oyana et al. (2006) consider the proximity of asthma
cases and controls to different pollution sources [12].
Their map contains an outer boundary shape of Buffalo,
New York. The map contains additional "reference" mate-
rial in terms of major roads. Cases (and controls) are dis-
played as a triangle or dot. The inner area of the study, the
"West Side" is heavily populated making the potential re-
engineering of addresses difficult. However, the re-engi-
neering process would be easier to accomplish in the
more sparsely populated areas (in terms of cases and con-
trols), and especially if the residence falls close to loca-
tions useful for registering the image. For example, the
area to the south of the map would be of particular con-
cern with relatively few cases, and where several roads
converge.
Lederman et al (2004), in their investigation of the effects
of the World Trade Center disaster on birth outcomes, cre-
ate a map showing work and home addresses as points
[11]. Geographic features in the map that would allow for
the georegistering of the image include the land/water
boundary and major roads. Although the map on the
journal page is relatively small, it is also possible to view
a larger version of the figure at the journal's website.
Eng et al (1999) use three maps in their study of toxoplas-
mosis on Vancouver island, British Columbia, with resi-
dences being displayed as points [10]. The first map
displays the geographic location of 94 acute cases of toxo-
plasmosis. The second and third maps display the loca-
tion of women screened during pregnancy, who were
either negative, or had non acute toxoplasmosis. These
maps appear to be relatively safe as they contain few geo-
graphic references suitable for the georegistering of the
image, beyond a detailed outer boundary of the map. As a
larger version of the map is available on the journals web-
site, it would still be interesting to see how close a re-engi-
neered coordinate would be to the actual address.
Huhn et al (2005), in their investigation of the 2002 West
Nile virus epidemic of Illinois, use a map displaying West
Nile virus cases in Cook County. A solid cross is used toInternational Journal of Health Geographics 2006, 5:44 http://www.ij-healthgeographics.com/content/5/1/44
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mark the addresses of 536 cases. Although the overlap of
crosses in the more case clustered areas would make the
re-engineering of individual residences difficult, there are
several sections of the map where relative geographic iso-
lation of cases occurs [13]. In a second publication inves-
tigating the same outbreak, cases are overlaid onto a raster
image of elevation [23]. This raises another issue, how
would the re-engineering process be improved if a com-
monly available grid of data is used as backdrop? A sec-
ond map in the same article is the most obvious candidate
for a successful re-engineering as human cases are dis-
played as crosses on a map of census tracts. This map con-
tains a greater georegistration potential than the Advocate
New Orleans map used in this paper.
In none of these examples is mention made of any mask-
ing procedure applied to the point placement of human
cases on the map. This suggests that the cases (usually
shown as points) should mirror the underlying street net-
work, and are therefore vulnerable to re-engineering.
These comments are not meant to be criticisms of the aca-
demics involved in each study as the danger of re-engi-
neering information from a map is a relatively new
concern, though warnings have previously been sounded
about mapping unmodified geocoded data [16,24]. There
are, however, other more proactive studies that should be
applauded for addressing confidentiality in their display.
Rothenberg et al. (2005) map the social and geographic
interconnections for a subgroup of HIV infected individu-
als in their Colorado Springs study using a spider plot
(nodes being connected with lines, with color being
added to indicate the strength of connection). The authors
comment that "...the map has insufficient detail to read
the exact placement of nodes." [26] However, in order to
preserve confidentiality each node was randomly moved
by 1600 m. The authors further state that this "masking"
allows for easier map interpretation while preserving the
geographic relationship between nodes and links.
Although the authors were mistaken in that the map does
contain sufficient detail to allow re-engineering (census
block boundaries are included), the random displace-
ment of the nodes makes this a mute point.
Previous research has shown that urban density, urban/
non-urban, and even length of street segment impact the
success of geocoding [19], and similarly this paper has
revealed how urban neighborhood structure plays a
marked role in the success of re-engineering residential
information. This is largely a result of two factors: the
housing pattern on a street, which can affect address-
matching results, and the amount of neighborhood detail
allowing for more accurate georegistering of the image.
For example, the London Canal area has the highest per-
centage of mortalities (37.5) being close (within 5 meters)
to a street section (Table 1). This area also has the lowest
percentage (4.2%) of locations falling in the greatest dis-
tance away from a street category (above 25 m). If we look
at the original georeferenced map, the London Canal area
has the greater number of adjoining Census tracts of the
three neighborhoods, resulting in more geographic detail,
which in turn allows for more accurate georegistering of
that part of the image. Although these coordinates are
close to the street network, this does not reflect the accu-
rate placement of geocoded points along a street, which in
turn would have an impact in terms of the distance
between mortality coordinate and verified residence. New
Orleans East was the most successful in terms of this
measure with just over 22% of the pairs within 10 meters.
This suggests that house spacing within this area allows
for a more accurate geocode. Most address matches are
calculated with the house number being proportionally
placed within the range of addresses on a street segment.
More accurate address placement tends to occur in
homogenous neighborhoods, such as in the suburbs, or
in newer housing developments such as in New Orleans
East. The worst neighborhood for geocode accuracy is the
Lower Ninth Ward, with no pairs being within 10 meters.
This can be explained by the considerable heterogeneity
of housing structure, both in terms of size and lot place-
ment. However, even in this neighborhood, a high pro-
portion of the re-engineered mortalities were found, and
50% of these were closer than to any simulated "address"
in 95 out of 100 simulation runs.
Conclusion
This paper has shown that any map containing point data,
even when little secondary spatial information is pre-
sented, is vulnerable to being re-engineered to reveal the
actual addresses associated with the points. It is therefore
vital that some masking occurs of the original point data.
Although HIPAA regulations state that health information
can only be disclosed, if all zip codes with the same three
initial digits exceed 20,000 people it is still feasible that a
point displayed on a Parish boundary with no political
subdivisions, meaning the cartographer is not violating
any HIPAA regulation in terms of an apparent minimum
denominator, could still be re-engineered if enough detail
is present in the boundary shape. The question needing
further discussion is how we should determine minimum
denominators. If such a re-engineering process places a
residence within a denominator area of 50 houses, this is
a violation of the spirit of HIPAA.
Further research should concentrate on the degree of
masking required in relation to urban structure, what
could be considered safe amounts of map detail, and an
appropriate minimum denominator of "alternative" resi-International Journal of Health Geographics 2006, 5:44 http://www.ij-healthgeographics.com/content/5/1/44
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dences. The suggestion should also be that until such
research has been conducted, are maps really necessary in
publications? Why not chose an abstract space on which
to display spatial patterns [25]. The reader of the paper
may need a graphic to understand the described relation-
ship between geographic features, but it is unlikely he/she
needs the actual geographic space. It is better to err on the
side of caution than to make a mistake that might lead to
a breach in patient privacy and further restrict the access
spatial researchers have to confidential data
Methods
A map from the Front Page of the December 30, 2005
Baton Rouge Advocate, entitled "Deaths from Katrina hit
both rich, poor", displayed a total of 412 mortality loca-
tions, though only 369 fell inside Orleans Parish which
contains New Orleans. This map was scanned and georeg-
istered using ArcMap 9.1. The process of georegistration,
also called registering or rectifying an image, converts a
representation of the earth into its real-world location by
assigning coordinates to the image. After scanning the
map, the image was added to an ESRI ArcMap 9.1 view
already containing a shapefile of Census 2000 tract
boundaries. On the Advocate  map the point pattern of
death locations is displayed on a choropleth map of pov-
erty by census tract. Poverty is classified into four catego-
ries graded by colours from light yellow to dark brown
(Figure 2). Due to the lack of streets or other geographic
references that could be used in the georegistration of the
map, only the Census tract layer was used as a source for
control points assigned to the image.
Georegistration
The 2000 Census tract boundary file provides intersec-
tions that are recognizable throughout the map and thus
were the primary source for assigning geographic coordi-
nates to the graphic. The accuracy of matching the image
to its real-world location is dependent on assigning con-
trol points evenly throughout the map. In this case, due to
reliance on recognizable tract boundaries, some areas
were assigned more control points than others. Also, in
the Advocate map, when contiguous Census tracts fall into
the same poverty classification the boundary between
them is no longer visible, thus degrading ability to use
these areas for control points. Even with these potential
sources of inaccuracy, the resulting overlay of paper map
and digital tract boundary left little error.
Digitizing death locations
Each mortality was heads-up digitized, meaning the mor-
tality circle was added into the GIS by being drawn around
its circumference using the mouse. Both this outer circle
and the centroid, the circle's center point, were captured as
digital layer files. The outer circle, once exported to
Google Earth covered approximately one-and-a-half city
blocks (Fig 2b). Each centroid was mapped onto a street
map of New Orleans. Figure 2 shows the digitised centro-
ids as red points on the original Advocate map.
Employing digitized death locations in field analysis
From Arc 9.1, 8.5 × 11 size maps were generated for each
neighborhood showing streets, street names and the digi-
tised centroids. These maps were used by the field team
who systematically went to each coordinate point on the
map, estimating exactly where they should find the resi-
dence along the street section, including on which side of
the road it should fall. The field team did not search for
the mortality residence beyond the immediate vicinity of
the dot on the map, unless the location was situated
inside a city block with no indication as to which street
section the residence fell. Those houses in which a mortal-
ity was marked by a search and rescue team were photo-
graphed, the address recorded, and a GPS coordinate
captured, using a Trimble GeoExplorer 3 hand-held GPS
receiver.
Comparing field data with re-engineered death locations
The latitude and longitude coordinates of the re-engi-
neered mortality and the verified address were displayed
on high-resolution imagery (1 foot resolution post-Kat-
rina imagery that originated with the Army Corps of Engi-
neers and was flown by 3001 Inc.) of New Orleans using
ESRI ArcMap 9.1. In order to determine how close the re-
engineered coordinates were to the Orleans Parish road
network, the distance between each coordinate and the
closest street section was recorded using the spatial join
feature in ArcMap 9.1. The distance was also calculated
between each pair of re-engineered coordinates and the
field verified address. A second distance measure was also
employed for these pairs being the number of separating
houses between the re-engineered coordinate and the
actual address. This count was easily achieved by using the
high-resolution imagery.
In order to determine if the re-engineered mortalities had
guided field teams to the verified residences or whether
the discovery was by chance alone, one hundred simula-
tion surfaces were created for each neighborhood. These
simulation surfaces were comprised of randomly located
residences, where the "n" for each neighborhood equalled
the number of re-engineered mortalities extracted from
the Advocate map (24 for New Orleans East, 20 for the
London Canal area, and 36 for the Lower Ninth Ward).
The simulation surface was created using Hawth's Analy-
sis Tools for ArcGIS which provide additional functions to
ESRI's ArcGIS program. The Generate Random Points tool
was used to randomly distribute points across the polygon
layer of Census tracts. In order to see how dissimilar a
geocoded surface was to a randomly generated point sur-
face in terms of mirroring the underlying street network,Publish with BioMed Central    and   every 
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the distance between each randomly generated point and
its closest street section was recorded using the spatial join
tool in Arc 9.1. Similarly, to see how frequently a ran-
domly generated point would fall closer to a field verified
address than a mortality coordinate, the distance between
the address and its closest randomly generated point was
recorded using the spatial join tool in Arc 9.1. By record-
ing this distance for 100 simulation runs, a test distribu-
tion of mortalities was created against which the distances
of the mortality coordinate and field verified address pairs
could be compared.
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